Abstract-We present a multi-agent framework for the formal verification of component-based systems after changes such as addition, removal and modification of components. The core of our approach is an Agent Verification Engine (AVE) that constructs evolvable Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agents to coordinate and plan the re-verification of component models after system changes. The engine provides BDI-agents with existing techniques for the compositional verification of component-based systems. We illustrate this integration for Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) constraint analysis and demonstrate our framework on requirements arising from industrial control systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Component-based software systems are increasingly common, and include business-and safety-critical systems from domains as diverse as healthcare, transportation and finance [25] . Critical systems are expected to be reliable since downtime often results in a decrease of revenue or unavailability of essential services. Formal verification techniques such as model checking or automated theorem proving can be used to provide irrefutable proof of a system's compliance to requirements by analysing mathematical models of the system against properties derived from the requirements.
Compositional verification techniques [3] , [2] decompose the verification of a large, monolithic system model into a sequence of small verification steps that are applied to the components of the system, thus enabling formal verification of much larger systems. However, these approaches do not take into account the system's runtime environment, where components are frequently added and updated or may unexpectedly fail. Agent-based modelling is widely used in safety or business critical systems as a means for intelligent adaptation in response to planned and unplanned runtime changes. This approach is well suited to adapt large scale cloud deployed systems [12] , [26] and industrial manufacturing applications [20] , [17] whose compliance to quality-of-service (QoS) requirements must be maintained during runtime.
In this paper, we introduce the Agent Verification Engine (AVE) which constructs agents to perceive, react, and adapt to runtime changes of a component-based system. These agents are based on the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) architecture [21] , in which agents operate in terms of motivation and beliefs. BDI-agents have a formal basis in logic to formalize an agent's decision making in an attempt to achieve its goals [9] . BDI-agents are constructed by AVE according to the system's architecture and observe components to detect changes. When changes happen, agents perform verification tasks to verify the model of components against properties to determine compliance with system requirements. The main contributions of this paper are (a) an algebraic specification of an agent verification engine based on BDIagents, (b) the integration of a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver to provide agents with verification capabilities, (c) an application of the engine to a real-world industrial control software case study, and (d) a prototype implementation of the agent verification engine using Jason AgentSpeak [4] .
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II provides key mathematical preliminaries. Section III formulates the agent verification engine algebraically and describes evolvable BDI-agent plans. Section IV integrates an existing SMT-based compositional verification approach into the engine. Section V applies the engine to analyse an industrial item sorting system. Section VI shows the effectiveness and scalability of our approach. Section VII discusses related work and Section VIII presents concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Assuming readers to have basic understanding of universal algebra [19] and BDI-agent architectures [21] , [4] , we define the following key tools and notations.
Signatures and Terms:
A signature Σ consists of a sort s and a finite number of operation symbols f : s n → s for n ≥ 0. Symbols of the form c → S are signature constants. A signature Σ contains the sort Bool with constants true, f alse → Bool and names the standard logical connectives ∧ and ¬. Operation symbols of the form b : s n → Bool are Σ-predicates. Σ-terms are defined by the rules Goals: If g is a predicate symbol and t = t 1 , . . . , t n a tuple of Σ-terms then !g(t) is an achievement goal an agent aims to achieve and ?g(t) is a test goal that tests if g(t) is a true belief. Acquiring a new belief or goal creates a trigger event within an agent. If b(t) is a belief atom then +b(t), −b(t) are triggering events corresponding to the addition and removal of beliefs. Similarly, +!g(t), −!g(t) and +?g(t), −?g(t) correspond to the addition and removal of achievement and test goals, respectively.
III. AGENT VERIFICATION ENGINE
This section algebraically specifies the Agent Verification Engine (AVE). The engine's workflow is depicted in Figure 1 and comprises the agent planner, that reads an algebraic system specification S and requirements R, a set A of BDI-agents constructed by the agent planner to verify components of S and an oracle ω. The workflow has two phases. In the agent construction phase, the agent planner constructs a set A = {α t1 , . . . , α tn } of BDI-agents for components t 1 , . . . , t n of the system S. Each agent is constructed with a plan library to determine compliance of its component with the requirements given by R. The agent invokes an external oracle ω which represents a compositional verification service to determine the component's satisfaction of requirements. In the agent runtime phase, an agent perceives localised component changes t in the runtime environment and notifies the agent planner. The agent planner transforms S by performing the corresponding term substitution S = S[t /t] of the agent's component term t with the new component term t to obtain S . The agent planner uses t to update the agent's beliefs and plan library.
A. The Oracle
Let M be a set of component models, P a set of properties and V a set of values. The oracle is an automated process that accepts as input a verification task (m, g, a) from the set W = M × P × [P → V ] and is modelled mathematically by the total function ω : W → V such that ω(m, g, a) = the value v obtained from the process (1) of verifying property g on model m under assumptions of a for model m ∈ M , g ∈ P and v ∈ V and the map a : P → V of properties to verification values. The oracle is programmed to always terminate, potentially due to failure. If a failure occurs, then a special unverified value u is returned by the service. We extend the set of values to include this element by setting V = V ∪ {u}.
Our choice of notation in (1) generalises assume-guarantee [11] , [14] 
We denote the list of assumptions and verification results obtained by component-wise verification as a. Using the assume-guarantee approach, the system requirements formalised as the property g ∈ P for the monolithic model m has verification result v under the assumptions a. In symbols, we write m, v |= g (m can be omitted if clear from the context).
B. Agent Construction Phase
We give an algebraic specification of component-based systems and use their inductive properties to derive the agent planner's construction of the agent set A . 
where the predicates model and property specify agent α c 's belief of the component model m and property g. Initially, the agent has the achievement goal !verify to determine the verification result v ∈ V of property g for model m. We define the context expression
such that the agent holds sufficient information about its component's model and property for the verification plan constructed by the agent planner. This plan has the form
Since the initial belief base (2) 
Agent Plans for Composite Components:
We give an inductive definition of the plans for agent α t assigned to the component term t = f (t 1 , . . . , t m ) with sub-components t 1 , . . . , t m and the operation symbol f ∈ Σ. The agent has beliefs of its component model m and property g, and thus the initial belief base of α t is set as B t = {model (m), property(g)}, similar to (2).
In general, the verification result m, v |= g of agent α t is dependent upon the verification values obtained by agents A t = {α t1 , . . . , α tm } for the sub-terms of t. Agent α t therefore must communicate with each agent in A t and construct assumptions a : P → V to be supplied to the oracle. To coordinate with agents α t1 , . . . , α tm , agent α t is constructed with the plan 
To facilitate communication with α t , each agent α ti is constructed with the plan
by the agent planner, which is triggered whenever its mental state is changed to the test goal ?givep, for
The plan body of (7) contains a special send action which enables transmission of messages between agents using the Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML) [16] which expresses an agent's intention for sending a message. Agents send messages for two purposes: i) to change the receiver's beliefs, or ii) to change the receiver's goals. In the plan body of (7), agent α ti 's property belief is unified with the variable P and sent to agent α t , who receives the belief and adds it to B t . Similarly, the verification value obtained from the oracle ω by α ti is sent to α t by the plan
The goal ?result(V ) is complete only when α ti completes its verification task and result ti (V ) is added to its belief base.
For the composite component represented by the component term t with sub-terms t 1 , . . . , t m , the context expression (3) is extended to
to ensure the values from agents α t1 , . . . , α tm have been received. The agent planner formulates two plans so that agent α t can achieve its verification goal !verify. The first plan is applicable whenever α t has not obtained values from agents α t1 , . . . , α tm . In this context, the plan
comprises the achievement subgoal !queryagents which triggers plan (5) and continues to attempt the achievement !verify.
In the context of receiving values from all sub-component agents, the plan invoked to achieve !verify is 
C. Agent Runtime Phase
Runtime environments are dynamic and changes such as the addition, removal and modification of components occur in rapid succession. In this section, we specify plans enabling an agent to sense localised changes of the components modelled by their verification task. When a component change occurs, the agent is required to adapt and evolve its beliefs and behaviour during system operation in order to maintain a verification task that correlates to the actual state of the system. Formally, agent α t is constructed with the plan
which executes the action sense to detect changes in the component t ∈ C(Σ). Component change detection only occurs after α t achieves its initial verification goal. We extend the agent's verification plan by appending the achievement goal !detect to the plan bodies listed in (4) and (10) .
Agent Change Perceptions:
The agent action sense notifies the engine that the system represented algebraically by the component term S is updated according to a component change sensed in the runtime environment. Mathematically, a component change is modelled as a component term t ∈ C(Σ) with an associated model m ∈ M and property g ∈ P. When a component change occurs, the engine first updates S and associated model and property. It then notifies agent α t of the new model m and property g , and finally adds a change perception to the belief base of agent α t corresponding to addition, removal or modification changes.
Modification Component Change:
Change perceptions are handled by agents in the following cases. When component t i of the component t ≡ f (t 1 , . . . , t m ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m is modified, a change perception modif ied is issued by the engine to agent α ti . In this case, the engine first updates the component model and property to m ti and g ti respectively. The engine updates the belief base B ti of the agent, replacing its model and property beliefs with information of the new verification task model(m ti ) and property(g ti ), respectively. The engine's change perception triggers the belief addition event +modif ied in the agent and is handled by the plan +modified : true ← !verify ∧ !notify.
supplied by the agent planner. The agent proceeds to call the oracle to verify its modified task, providing the agent with a new belief result(V ). Next, the agent achieves the goal !notify to notify agent α t that re-verification is complete. The plan
communicates the !reverif y ti achievement goal to agent α t . Agent α t attempts to achieve this goal using the plan
which obtains the modified property a i and updated verification result v i from α ti . The !verify goal uses the updated assumptions function a : P → V to invoke the oracle where
and notifies agents that re-verification has occurred.
Addition Component Change:
In the general case, the component term t = f (t 1 , . . . , t m ) has m sub-components. The addition of the new component t m+1 to t is specified by the component term t = f (t 1 , . . . , t m , t m+1 ) . Mathematically, we define the substitution operation
to replace instances of t with t in the component term representation S to obtain S . When the system representation is updated, the engine adds the change perception add(t m+1 ) to agent α t 's belief base, triggering a belief addition event that is handled accordingly by the plan
The action create(T ) invokes the agent planner to construct a new agent α tm+1 and assign it the verification task w associated with the new component t m+1 . Once constructed, the agent completes its initial achievement goal !verify. The action replan described in the next section is used by α t to take into account the added component. • a re-verification plan (13), adding and removing plans corresponding to sub-components dependencies.
When the agent receives the new plans, the agent reinitialises and attempts to achieve their initial verification goal.
Re-verification Policies: Plans (12) and (13) perform reverification that essentially follow recently introduced incremental verification techniques [13] , [14] based on component dependencies defined by the system's architecture. By using a BDI-agent approach, these techniques are extendable to generalised verification policies comprising programmable agent behaviours to perform remedial actions taken in response to component change. Agent behaviour can express policies to send conditional notifications only when their component becomes non-compliant to requirements after a change, perform verification steps involving other oracles, or notify other agents specified by the application domain requirements.
IV. A COMPOSITIONAL APPROACH TO SMT
We instantiate AVE with an existing SMT-based technique. The following concepts are defined in [13] and reproduced for completeness.
Component Models:
To integrate an SMT verification service with the engine we define M = P(Z) + , such that each component term t is modelled as a finite subset Z t of variables from the set Z inductively on the structure of component terms:
Z ti for each operation f ∈ Σ and component terms t 1 , . . . , t m .
Component Properties: Let P = F (Γ, Z) such that component requirements are quantifier-free first order formulae over the signature Γ, defined inductively by the rules
where t 1 and t 2 are terms, and φ 1 and φ 2 are formulae.
We often display the variables that appear in a formula by writing φ(z) to mean that the formula φ has at least one instance of the variables in the tuple z = (z 1 , . . . , z p ).
SMT Resolution: Satisfiability modulo theories represent a class of theoretical techniques and practical tools that determine the satisfiability of a formula expressed in terms of tests and operations in a signature Γ. An SMT technique smt : The requirements function R : C(Σ) → P supplied to the agent verification engine associates each component term t with a logical formula φ t such that var(φ t ) ⊆ Z t where var(φ t ) is the set of variables in φ t and Z t is the component model of t. We use the inductive properties of component terms to compute the conjunction φ = φ t1 ∧ · · · ∧ φ tm of formulae associated to the components t 1 , . . . , t m of S. By resolving φ using smt, we get an assignment a : P → V of values from V to variables in φ such that system requirements R are satisfied. We also define the function mono : C(Σ) → F (Γ, Z) such that mono(t) is the monolithic formula of t, by induction over the structure of component terms.
Let t be a component term in C(Σ).
Base case: for t ≡ c i the basic component c i , we have mono(c i ) = φ ci .
Inductive step: for t ≡ f (t 1 , . . . , t m ) with sub-components t 1 , . . . , t m and operation symbol f ∈ Σ, we have mono
Compositional SMT Resolution: As the component-based system S typically contains a large number of components and requirements, resolving a monolithic formula mono(S) involves a huge constraint problem and is generally unfeasible for a single agent to complete during runtime. Instead, we describe a compositional approach based on the results of [13] , [24] which constructs smaller resolution steps to be carried out independently. The solutions obtained in each step are combined to form a solution for the monolithic formula.
The resolution of the conjunction φ 1 (y)∧φ 2 (z) of independent formulae (no shared variables) may be decomposed into two smaller steps a 1 = smt(φ 1 (y)) and a 2 = smt(φ 2 (z)), combined using the operation ⊕ :
We can prove that a 1 ⊕ a 2 |= φ 1 (y) ∧ φ 2 (z) (cf. Lemma 4.1 [13] ). We extend this observation to n > 1 independent logical formulae φ 1 , . . . , φ n and construct an assignment v |= ∧ n i=1 φ i through a sequence of independent resolution steps v 1 |= φ 1 , . . . , v n |= φ n . (cf. Theorem 4.1 [13] ).
The SMT Oracle: Compositional SMT resolution serves as the basis for instantiating the assume-guarantee oracle ω specified by (1) to perform compositional SMT resolution. The oracle accepts as input a verification task comprising (∪ i∈{1,...,n} var(a i )) , the union of the variable sets for g and a 1 , . . . , a n .
We model the oracle as the total function ω :
that performs smt resolution to compute an assignment of values in V to the model variables in m that satisfies the conjunction g ∧ a 1 ∧ · · · ∧ a n of logical formulae. Thus, we
V. CASE STUDY
We introduce an industrial control system to illustrate our agent-based verification engine. Figure 2 depicts an item sorting system (ISS), typically used to sort high volume item streams within systems such as airport baggage handling and food packaging. Items are placed in an initial position by a robotic arm. Horizontal and vertical pushers use sensors to detect items and then direct them towards user-specified end-points. Additional robotic arms remove items from the end-points. The system software is written using the IEC 61499 [18] language, which enables component-based design where components contain finitely nested networks of (sub) components. Figure 3 shows the architecture of the ISS. The system S comprises components vert, horiz and robot, representing the control programs for the vertical and horizontal pushers, and the robotic arms, respectively. Each component has three sub-components labelled from A to I.
Components of IEC 61499 programs execute on devices such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Components deployed onto the same PLC communicate using faster local mechanisms such as shared buffers. Components on different PLCs communicate using networks like Ethernet. For the ISS, which handles high item volumes, system speed can be significantly reduced if critical path sub-components like communicating pushers execute on different PLCs. Also, the ISS can be made more dependable by deploying multiple instances of sub-components A − I across available PLCs, numbered 1 to p (p ≥ 2), according to the following highlevel requirements R:
R1 each component has 1 to 10 instances deployed R2 A − C have at least 4 instances deployed R3 G has exactly 3 instances on PLC 2 R4 H must not be deployed on PLC 1 R5 all instances of D, E and F are identically distributed
The deployment configuration problem determines a distribution of component instances of the ISS S across p PLCs to satisfy the high-level requirements R.
System Specification in AVE:
We define a component signature Σ and express an algebraic specification of the system architecture depicted in Figure 3 . Let the set of component terms be denoted as C. We set the basic components of the system A, . . . , I and define an operation symbol c : C × C → C. For the ISS, we have the component term
where, vert ≡ c(A, c(B, C)), horiz ≡ c(D, c(E, F)) and robot ≡ c(G, c(H, I)).
Component models: To apply the compositional SMT resolution technique described in Section IV to the deployment configuration problem, we model sub-components A, . . . , I by finite sets Z A , . . . , Z I of variables. E.g., A is modelled by the set Z A = {Az 1 , . . . , Az p } of integer-typed variables from the set Z such that the assignment Az i = n models the deployment of n instances of component A onto the i th PLC. By definition, we have the model Z S = Z vert ∪Z horiz ∪Z robot associated with the component term S, where
Requirements Specification We define a mapping φ : C(Σ) → F (Γ, Z) by formalising requirements R1 -R5 of the ISS architecture as logical formulae over integer-type variables to be associated with components of S. Let Γ be a signature comprising sorts for integers and Boolean, symbols for the standard arithmetic operations, equality and inequality predicates. Initially, we set φ t = , that signifies the case where component t is not constrained. Requirement R1 sets the range of deployed instances for each sub-component of S between 1 and 10, with non-negative number of instances over any PLC. For sub-component A, we express this requirement as the formula
Similarly, all other sub-components B − I are assigned formulae φ Lastly, we formalise Requirement R5 which states that the subcomponents of D, E and F must have identical distributions of instances across the PLCs. We define the formula
where the model for vert comprises variables from its subcomponent models Z D , Z E , and Z F .
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATION
We developed a generic multi-agent simulator of the agent verification engine as a open-source Java application. The engine's implementation is based on Jason AgentSpeak [4] . Jason has a theoretical basis which is amenable to our formal approach for system adaptation and has built-in, extensible support for multi-agent system distribution over networks. We used Jason's standard architecture for agent perceptions, inter-communication and actions. The AVE's implementation comprises the following core classes
• RunTimeEnvironment<M,P,V> simulates perceptible component changes within the system's runtime environment and executes agent actions (M for models, P for properties and V for verification results) • Engine<M,P,V> maintains the system representation and compositional verification technique • AgentPlanner<M,P,V> constructs agents and provides new plans after changes occur.
• CompVerify, a compositional verification paradigm providing abstract methods add, modify and remove for updating the system's algebraic specification.
Agent Verification Engine for the ISS:
We instantiated AVE for the deployment configuration problem for the ISS as follows. First, Z3CompVerify, a concrete class utilising the compositional SMT approach described in Section IV was developed. The oracle ω defined by (15) is implemented using the Microsoft satisfiability modulo theories solver Z3 [8] . AVE was also provided with S, the architecture (16) of the ISS, as well as a mapping φ : C(Σ) → F (Γ, Z) that assigns logical formulae to components of the system.
When the engine receives these inputs, the agent planner constructs the necessary agents that co-operate to solve the deployment configuration problem. Figure 4 depicts a tree comprising ten agents in the set A constructed by the agent planner as described in Section III. Each node is labeled with (5), (7) and (8) respectively.
Once the engine has been initialised, agents in A attempt to achieve their verification goal. We consider this process for agent α A as follows. The agent has initial beliefs model (Z A ) and property(φ A ). It then attempts to achieve goal !verify using plan (10) by invoking ω(Z A , φ A , η) to obtain assignment v A = {Az 1 → 1, Az 1 → 3}, storing the belief result(v A ). It also attempts the achievement goal !detect defined in (11) to sense changes in component A during runtime.
The configuration problem is resolved when the result belief is stored by α S . α S carries out the following steps for this purpose. α S first queries the agents α vert , α horiz and α robot and forms the assumption function a : P → V such that a(φ vert ) = v vert , a(φ horiz ) = v horiz , and a(φ robot ) = v robot . α S then invokes the oracle v S = ω(Z S , , a), where Z S is the component model of S, is the empty formula. Finally, α S stores +result(v S ) in its belief base. Table I depicts the value v S obtained by the SMT process carried out by the oracle. The agent's belief represents one possible assignment mapping to satisfy all requirements in R.
Experimental Results
We evaluated the performance of AVE by running a series of experiments starting with the ISS architecture shown in Figure 3 and subsequently increasing the system size by five components at each step, corresponding to an increase of 5 agents and 50 variables in the Z3 specification of the system requirements (assuming 10 available PLCs). The experiments hence considered system sizes containing between 10 and 60 agents. A standard PC running Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bits with an Intel i7 2.1GHz Processor and 16 GB RAM was used for the tests. We measured the time for α S to acquire the belief result(v S ) and compared it to the cumulative time across all oracle invocations, corresponding to the time needed to complete minimal number of steps to resolve the deployment configuration problem using standard compositional SMT resolution. The results of this experiment are presented in Figure  5 . All runs completed under 7 seconds. For small system sizes, the difference in speed of the two approaches is negligible. As We also carried out the following experiments to evaluate the performance of our implementation for re-configuration after a system change is perceived by an agent. /c(c(G, c(H, I) ), R)] and add(R) is added to α robot belief base. Next, agent α robot issues the action to create(R). The agent planner then submits new plans to α robot , who invokes the oracle with assumptions from α G to α I and α R . Agent α R obtains a new belief of the result. Finally, α robot notifies α S , resulting in a new result belief for α S that includes the new verification result. Figure 6 shows AVE consistently took about 37 milliseconds to re-configure the system, ranging in size from 10 to 60 agents. In contrast, global reconfiguration of the entire system took increasingly longer as system size increased.
Modifying Requirements:
We considered updated requirements to change the deployment of the pushers over available PLCs. Such updates may happen often for the ISS, in order to react to changing item volumes and types. As Figure 6 shows, the re-configuration effort grew from about 67 milliseconds to 110 milliseconds for systems sized from 10 to 60 agents. In contrast, a complete re-configuration can take as much as nine times longer to reverify, requiring 1000 milliseconds to completely reverify the largest system containing 60 agents. Experiments to compare re-verification time after an agent removal due to component failure showed that on average it takes 58 ms for agent α S to obtain an updated result belief, whereas global reconfiguration takes 897 ms on average, for systems containing 10 to 60 agents.
VII. RELATED WORK
There have been many approaches to solve the system reconfiguration problem that we used to demonstrate the agent verification engine. Various formal notations [1] , [27] , [28] , [15] , [6] specify and verify component-based systems whose architectures can evolve at run-time with the addition or removal of components. We address a similar problem in this paper but by contrast, our work delegates verification tasks to agents rather than handling them in a centralised way. In [23] , two configuration protocols for deploying a cloud application over multiple virtual machines are proposed and verified using formal methods. In contrast to our work, the protocols proposed in this article do not take into account component failures and subsequent re-configuration actions.
In [5] , a reconfiguration protocol is proposed that can handle any number of failures during a reconfiguration. This protocol expects reconfiguration decisions to be made before-hand, unlike our approach which uses agents to make reconfiguration decisions based on changes in the system architecture, requirements, or device availability. Another approach that incorporates agent technology is Lira [7] , a light-weight, agentbased reconfiguration engine. Each component in a given distributed software system has a unique agent associated with it. An agent handles reconfiguration requests for its associated component. RECoMa [10] is a configuration manager can help find appropriate computer platforms to deploy software agents of a multi-agent system. All available devices on which available components can be deployed are treated as equal, each capable of deploying the components allocated to it. However, our framework can be extended to heterogeneous platforms by the use of requirements that specify constraints on the device's deployment.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presents a generic Agent Verification Engine in which agents observe components and determine their compliance to system requirements using a supplied compositional verification technique. Agents communicate verification results such that validation of localised components infer validation of the entire system. A key benefit of the approach is the inherently distributed nature of the agents constructed by the engine, providing a decentralised method to apply compositional verification to large-scale component-based systems.
Future work includes extending the theoretical underpinnings of our approach. We defined the engine as a translation from an algebraic specification of the system architecture to agent behaviours. BDI-agents were chosen to express reverification behaviours since they have a rich logical framework [22] that is required to prove the correctness of the agents constructed by the engine. Secondly, the engine can be extended to include agent interpretation of verification results, forming instructions to be provided as input for actuators to affect the environment in a way that component compliance is restored after a change. Lastly, there is no end to the kinds of verification techniques to instantiate the engine and solve domain specific problems from areas such as industrial control systems or cloud computing technologies.
